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INTRODUCTION
The shorter textbooks on equity have given but passing attention
to the subject of appeal.' Professor McClintock stresses chiefly the
scope of review. 2 He points out that in common law cases, which are
reviewed by writ of error, the only question is whether the judgment
should be affirmed or should be reversed because of errors committed
to which exceptions were taken at the time. In equity, on the other
hand, review is by appeal, and the question is, not whether the lower
court committed error, but whether it rendered a decree which should
have been rendered in the light of the entire case as disclosed by the
record. In common law cases the appellate court could ordinarily
review only rulings of law. In equity cases, on the other hand, the
appellate court could review findings of fact as well as conclusions of
law. This power was freely exercised so long as evidence was taken
in writing. But when the evidence came to be taken orally in open
court, the appellate court gave much more weight to the findings of
fact by the trial judge since he had seen and heard the witnesses testify
and could therefore better determine their credibility. But even then,
Professor McClintock concludes, the appellate court was not bound by
the findings of the court below on the issues of fact.
Equity appeals are also discussed by Professor Clephane in the
last nine pages of his Handbook of the Law of Equity Pleading and
Prctice.3  He makes note of the following features of such appeals:
ordinarily they lie only from final decrees; appeals can be taken only
by the parties to the writ or their representatives; time and manner of
taking appeals are wholly statutory; appellant must generally give a
* This paper was delivered to the Equity Round Table Council of the Association
of American Law Schools at the December meeting, 1941, of which Professor Orfield
was also chairman.
t Professor of Law, University of Nebraska; member, U. S. Supreme Court Ad-
visory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure; general consultant, American Law
Inst. Code of Evidence; member and secretary, Nebraska Supreme Court Advisory
Committee on Practice, Pleading and Evidence, and chairman of subcommittee on ap-
pellate procedure; author of CRImlNAL APPEALs IN AMICA (1939), Supreme Court of
Nebraska: Procedure, Organization, Selection and Tenure (i94o) 19 NEB. L. BULL.
241, and other articles in legal periodicals.
I. There is no discussion of appeal in WALSHr, A TRAErisE ox EquInr (I930),
nor in CLARK, EQUIn (igig). Of course, it should be borne in mind that these books
are concerned primarily with substantive law.
2. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY (1936) § I8.
3. (1926) pp. 417-425. The discussion rather closely parallels that in SHIPMAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EQUIrnn PLEADING (1897) 154-158, to whom proper credit
is given by Professor Clephane.
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bond to answer for costs. In case the appeal is to operate as a super-
sedeas, a bond for performance of the decree is required. An equity
case is reviewable as to both law and fact though the conclusions of
the trial court on the facts are highly persuasive. But, generally, only
objections raised below will be reviewed.
The significant thing about common law pleadings in error was
that their scope was so limited that they did not bring about a review
of the merits of the judgment. The appellate court did not pass on
whether or not the judgment below was fair or just, nor on what the
correct judgment should have been. Instead, the sole question was,
Did the trial judge commit an error? If he did, the judgment must
be reversed. The use of the jury in common law cases was the all-
important factor which for centuries kept the scope of review limited
to the question of the commission of error. The appellate court could
ascertain whether an error had been made in admitting or excluding
evidence or in other matters involved in the trial before the jury, but
it could not be certain what effect, if any, it had had upon the verdict.
Hence, all that the appellate court could do was to remand the case
to the trial court for new trial. The jury had the exclusive right to
weigh the evidence and ascertain the facts. Correction of the verdict
by the appellate court would be an infringement of the right to jury
trial.
The function of an appellate court in reviewing equity cases, on
the other hand, is not to search the record for errors of law, but to
examine the result in the light of the evidence to see if justice has been
done.4 Thus, the equity doctrine is in accord with the modern theory
that the primary purpose of review is to see that justice is done in the
individual case. The law doctrine, however, places the stress on the
other possible appellate functions: the maintenance of trial court
standards, and the development of the law. One of the needed reforms
in our legal procedure is to take over into other fields the equity notion
of the function of review.
I. APPEAL IN ENGLAND
The history of the scope of review in Continental Europe has
been wholly different from that in England and the United States.5
4. Blume, Review of Facts i. Non-fury Cases (1936) 2o J. Am. JUD. Soc. 68, 72.
Chief Justice Lamm stated in Lee v. Lee, 258 Mo. 599, 604, 167 S. W. 1030, 1032
(914) : "In chancery the question is, not what the chancellor instructed himself to do,
or how he talked the matter over with himself-the question is: Did he seek. equity and
do it?"
5. ENGELMANN, HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE (Millar's Trans.
1927) 369; POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES (I94I) 6; Wright, French
and English Civil Procedure (1926) 42 L. Q. REV. 327; Du Vivier, The Appellate
Courts and Appellate Procedure of France (1926) 6 Am. L. SCHOOL REv. I.
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This has been because no right of jury trial has been involved. On
the Continent the same persons tried both issues of fact and issues of
law. There was no dividing of the issues between judge and jury
as in the Anglo-American system. Hence, the appellate court could
review the facts as fully as it could the legal issues. The appellate
court did not have to send the case back to the trial court for a new
trial, but could itself dispose of the whole controversy and render the
judgment which should have been rendered.
While the review of cases at law in England was quite different
from the Continental review, nevertheless the English courts applied
the Continental theory to the review of chancery cases. The purpose
of review in chancery cases was not simply to determine whether an
error had been committed, but rather to determine what the propei
decree should be. But this did not mean, until quite recently, that the
appellant received a genuine rehearing as he might on the Continent.
The appellate court could not deal with new questions. The chancery
appeal thus resembled the common law writ of error in being confined
to the review of matters previously passed upon by the trial court."
There could be no presentation of new evidence or new points not
raised below. The cramped scope of review was thus as follows: in
law cases there could be no review of the facts at all, while in chan-
cery cases there might be such a review provided that the review did
not involve the presentation of new evidence or of new points not
raised below. It has been said that the limited chancery review was a
survival of the early common law theory of an accusation against the
judge.
7
Chancery, patterning itself on the model of the Roman and the
canon law, developed the appeal as a rehearing of the case long before
the nineteenth century Parliamentary reform of the scope of review in
cases at law." In fact, Holdsworth states that "equity had always
adopted the straightforward method of questioning a decision by a
rehearing of the case." 9 It has been asserted that the broad scope of
equity review was due to the dominant position of the King when the
chancery system was developing.10 This is dubious, however, inas-
much as the Roman and canon law, from which the equity procedure
was derived, 11 permitted a hearing de novo on appeal.
6. 2 DANir-, CHANCERY PRAcrICE (4th ed. 1871) 1459.
7. Sunderland, Improvement of Appellate Procedure (194o) 26 IOWA L. REV. 3;
reprinted in (1941) 25 J. AM. J D. Soc. 79.
8. ORnIED, CRImiNAL APPEALs IN AMERICA (1939) 28.
9. 9 HOLDSWORTHr, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1926) 373.
io. Goodnow, The Writ of Certiorari (1891) 6 POL. Scr. Q. 493.
ii. In Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 Dall. 321, 327 (U. S. 1796), Mr. Chief Justice Ells-
worth states: "An appeal is a process of civil law origin, and removes a cause entirely;
subjecting the fact as well as the law, to a review and a re-trial; but a writ of error
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While up to 18oo common law procedure was superior to equity
procedure in most phases, Professor Holdsworth has stated that equity
procedure was nevertheless superior in three aspects: (i) equity pro-
cedure involved the commencement of an action by one uniform writ,
the writ of subpcena; (2) equity had a much less technical doctrine of
election of remedies; and (3), of more interest to us, equity appellate
procedure involved a rehearing, while the common law still resorted
to the writ of error and bill of exceptions.-
2
Appellate procedure in chancery prior to the past century involved
delay and expense.' 3 The procedure up to the decree was in itself
very dilatory. But even after the decree had been drawn, a long time
could elapse before the suitor had final relief. Dickens' Bleak Houe
with its long drawn out case of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce tells the story.
At any time prior to enrollment there could be a petition for rehear-
ing to the trial judge. The enrollment of the decree was often long
delayed. Even when it had been enrolled it could in certain cases be
vacated. If there could be no vacation, there could still be a bill of
review. Even if the bill of review failed there could still be an appeal
from the trial judge to the chancellor, and from him to the House of
Lords. Furthermore, the chancellor could, like the trial judge, rehear a
case brought to him on appeal. No reasonable finality seemed possible.
As Professor Holdsworth states: "Any point arising in the course
of a suit might be discussed (i) before the Master of the Rolls, (2)
before the same person by way of rehearing, (3) before the Lord
Chancellor, and (4) before the House of Lords." 14 In 1813 the con-
gestion and delay resulted in the creation of a Vice-Chancellor to
assist the Chancellor.15 But little good was accomplished, since the
new official could hear only cases especially delegated to him by the
Chancellor and an appeal lay to the Chancellor. After much discus-
sion in Parliament a commission was appointed in 1825 to inquire
into the condition of the Chancery Court. But Lord Eldon headed
the commission and a whitewash ensued. Two additional Vice-
Chancellors were appointed in 1842.
is a process of common law origin, and it removes nothing for re-examination but the
law."
12. 9 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit supra note 9, at 372.
13. Id. at 368; POTTER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF EQUITY AND ITS
COURTS (1931) I9.
14. I HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1922) 438. It was established
in the latter half of the seventeenth century that appeal lay to the House of Lords from
the equity side of the Court of Chancery. I HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 372; I NEVLAIN,
THE PRACICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCCERY (1826) 370; POUND, op. cit. supra
note 5, at 63.
15. 1 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. s pra note 14, at 442. For perhaps the classic account
of rehearings and appeals in English Chancery see 2 DANIELL, PLEADING AND PRAC-
TICE OF THE HIGH Cotmv OF CHANCaEY (6th ed. 1894) 1439-1485. See also I NEW-
LAND, op. cit supra note 14, 'at 360-377.
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In 1851 an appellate court intermediate between the Vice-
Chancellors and the Master of the Rolls on the one hand, and the
House of Lords on the other, was established.-6 It was made up of
two Lord Justices in Chancery and the Lord Chancellor. On the
request of the Lord Chancellor they could be assisted by the Master
of the Rolls or the Vice-Chancellors. Thus, the chancery system con-
sisted of the Master of the Rolls and the three Vice-Chancellors sitting
separately as trial judges; the Lord Justices in Chancery, usually
assisted by the Master of the Rolls, sitting together as an appel-
late court; and the House of Lords. An appeal might be taken
from a single justice to the Court of Appeal in Chancery composed of
three Chancery judges. 17 From this, a second appeal lay to the House
of Lords.
In 1854 Parliament authorized the waiver of juries in common
law actions.' 8 Looking backwards one might have expected that the
appellate courts would now be permitted to review the facts in jury-
waived cases. But the act of 1854 also provided that the finding of
the judge in the jury-waived case should have the same effect as the
verdict of a jury. It required the Judicature Act to eliminate this
restriction upon the effectiveness of appeal in jury-waived cases.
English appellate courts now review questions of fact in such cases as
freely as in suits in equity.19
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the method of taking
evidence was by written questions and -answers. All depositions read
at the original hearing were read again on appeal.20 The losing party
might, if he wished, appeal to the Lord Chancellor sitting as the House
of Lords.21 In that event each party prepared a short statement of the
pleading, evidence, and proofs (called a "case") and an appendix,
which contained in their entirety such documents and evidence read in
the lower court as he deemed essential to presenting his case.22 The
proceedings moved very slowly and involved great expense. 23
But all this was radically altered in 1852. The prior mode of
examination in writing before officers of the court was abolished
except in certain situations. Parties might give notice whether they
wished to have testimony orally or by affidavit.24 Two years later,
however, the Lord Chancellor issued an order that all testimony should
16. 1 HOLDSWORT4, op. cit. supra note 14, at 443, 444.
17. Kales, Thw English Judicature Acts (1921) 4 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 133; see also
The Suprenme Court of Judicature Act and Law Reform (1874) 8 Am. L. REv. 256, 258.
18. 17 & 18 Vicr., c. 125, § I (854).
19. (1940) ANNUAL PRACTICE, Order 58.
20. 2 DANIELL, CHANCERY PRACTICE (4th ed. 1867) 1366-1369.
21. 3 DANIELL, CHANCERY PRACTICE (Ist ed. 1841) 129.
22. PALMER, PRACTICE IN THE HoUSE OF LoRDs (1830) 50, 51.
23. EGAN, LmmrERs ON DELAY IN CHANCERY (1850).
24. 15 & I6 VICT., C. 86, §§ 28-30 (1852).
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be taken before an examiner. The examiner was usually to report the
testimony as a narrative and not in question and answer form.2 5
As might be expected, the Judicature Act of 1873 26 laid down
some all-important principles concerning equity procedure. In all
cases, both at law and in equity, testimony was to be taken by oral
examination, except when the court ordered otherwise for special rea-
sons. The parties might, however, agree by formal written consent
that the testimony be taken by affidavit. In cases where depositions
were used they were ordinarily to be in narrative form. Of greater
interest is the nature of the record in the Court of Appeal, the newly
created appellate court. Depositions appeared in the record as previ-
ously, while affidavits appeared by printed or office copies. Oral testi-
mony appeared by production of the judge's notes or such other mate-
rials as the court might deem expedient.27 This practice was continued
in effect in the twentieth century.2 8 English appellate practice has
remained about the same since 1888.
Of great significance is the power of the Court of Appeal to
receive further evidence. This may be by oral testimony, by affidavit
or by deposition .2  This may save the expense and delay of remanding
a case to the lower court for further proceedings. Thus, testimony
may be presented to the Court of Appeal by deposition, by affidavit,
by summary through the judge's notes, and orally when further evi-
dence is received. One of the respects in which English equity proce-
dure is greatly superior to the equity procedure of the vast majority
of our state courts, as well as to that of the Federal courts, is this power
of the appellate court to hear new evidence.
About 1912 Lord Loreburn, the English Chancellor, thus described
how a case is made up for appeal and what methods are adopted for
shortening the transcript under the reformed equity procedure in
England:
"The method is different for the Court of Appeal and the
House of Lords, to which an appeal from the Court of Appeal is
allowed.
"In the Court of Appeal, where there is a great deal of busi-
ness, including many small cases and many purely interlocutory
appeals, a case is not, as a rule, formally made up at all. Copies
of the pleadings and of the documents, and transcripts of the evi-
dence if there has been a transcript made, are furnished to each
25. I DANIELL, CHANCERY PRACTICE (3d ed. 1857) 716.
26. 36 & 37 VieM., c. 66. See rule 36 promulgated under the statutes.
27. (1927) ANNUAL PRACTICE, Order 58, rule ii. See i DANIELL, CHANCERY
PRACTICE (7th ed. i9oi) 1O72.
28. 15 & 16 GEO. V., c. 49, § 103 (1925).
29. (1927) ANNUAL PRACrcE, Order 58, rule 4. See i DANiELL, op. Ci. mtpra
note 27, at lO74.
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of the judges. If there has been no transcript, then the evidence
is gathered from the trial judge's notes or from the notes or recol-
lection of counsel. Each of these pieces, namely, pleadings, docu-
ments, and evidence, is separate; no attempt is, as a rule, made to
make up a case, and the material is used as it would be on a hear-
ing in the court of first instance. Sometimes, of course, in heavy
cases all the materials are printed, but this is where they have
been printed in the court of first instance for the convenience of
parties." 30
Thus there is not the least suggestion concerning a narrative rec-
ord in the present English practice.31 No printed records of any kind
have ever been required in the English Court of Appeal.32  No written
briefs are ever used in that court, and the only method employed for
presentation of the views of the lawyers is the oral argument. 33
The English Court of Appeal may finally dispose of a case. The
Judicature Act provides:
".. for all the purposes of and incidental to the hearing and
determination of any appeal, . . . the Court of Appeal shall have
all the power, authority and jurisdiction of the High Court." 34
Thus the Court of Appeal has, besides its jurisdiction to hear
appeals, all the powers of a trial court. It may in its discretion con-
sider points raised for the first time on appeal, though this may result
in depriving even the successful appellant of his costs.3 5 It may avoid
the need of a new trial. It may, however, grant a new trial where that
is just. It may, as has been seen, hear further evidence on appeal.
There is an absolute right to introduce such evidence in cases of appeal
from interlocutory orders, or when the evidence concerns matters
occurring after the time of the trial court's decision.3 6 With respect
to other appeals, leave of the Court of Appeal is necessary before such
evidence may be introduced. Such leave will not be given where the
3o. The Operation of the Reformed Equity Procedure in England (1912) 26 HARv.
L. REV. 99, IO6-107. This statement was made by the Chancellor in response to a ques-
tion propounded to him by Mr. Justice Lurton of the United States Supreme Court
prior to the adoption of the Federal Equity Rules in I912. His answer related to cases
in law and equity, but not to admiralty or probate or divorce cases, which, however, he
stated were not very much different
For another good short summary of English appellate procedure see Atlin, Appeal
in English Law (927) 3 CAm. L. J. i.
3z. Griswold and Mitchell, The Narrative Record in Federal Equidty Appeals
(1929) 42HARv. L. REV. 483.
32. (1940) ANNUAL PRAcric, Order 58, rule ii.
33. Sunderland, An Appraisal of English Procedure (1925) II A. B. A. J, 773,
779. 34. 15 & 16 GEo. V, c. 49, § 27 (I) (1925).
35. (I928)ANNuAL PRACriCE, Order 58, rule 8.
36. (1940) ANNUAL PRAcmC_, Order 58, rule 4. See Note (1929) 38 YALE L. J.
971. In practice the introduction of new evidence is relatively rare. Atldn, Appeal in
Englatd (1927) 3 CAmB. L. J. 1, 8.
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party deliberately or carelessly failed to produce such evidence. The
evidence may be presented by oral testimony, by affidavit, by deposition,
or by reference to an expert for inquiry and report. The appellant is
to notify the respondent that he will apply for leave to introduce new
evidence. If he wishes to examine witnesses before the Court of
Appeal he must notify that court and obtain leave before the hearing
on appeal.
While in America there is usually no appeal from interlocutory
orders,3 7 in England there is an absolute right to appeal from certain
interlocutory orders, while others are appealable only with leave.38
Among the interlocutory orders appealable without leave are orders
granting or denying an injunction.
39
If application is made for a new trial, it is made directly to the
Court of Appeal, and not to the trial court as in America.40  It may
even upset the verdict of a jury if all the facts are clear. The proce-
dure in applying for a new trial is like that in taking an appeal.
41
An English appeal does not, as in some American states, auto-
matically stay execution. 42  An appellant wishing such a stay must
apply to the trial court, and if refused, to the Court of Appeal. Ordi-
narily the appellant need not give security for costs. 43  There are no
writs of error, no bills of exception, and no assignments of error.
44
Notice of motion for a rehearing must be served on the respondent
within fourteen days in case of appeal from interlocutory orders, and
six weeks from a final judgment, but may be extended by the trial
court or by the Court of Appeal.
45
As has been seen, the common law notion of review did not involve
a rehearing of the case. Professor Holdsworth states: "The idea of
an appeal by means of a rehearing came into English law from the
Chancery; and it was not till the Judicature Acts that the common law
procedure in error in civil cases was swept away, and the Chancery
procedure substituted for it." 46
In England today the facts may be reviewed and new evidence
admitted even in jury cases. 47  The English courts are, of course,
untroubled by any constitutional guaranty of jury trial. Yet the prac-
37. (1923) 34 YALE L. J. 905.
38. Judicature Act, i5 & 16 GEo. V, c. 49, § 3I (Ic) (1925).
39. Judicature Act, i5 & 16 GEo. V, c. 49, § 31 (Ii) (925).
4o. Judicature Act, 15 & 16 GEo. V, c. 49, § 30 (I) (1925); (941) ANNUAL
PRAcrICF, Order 39, rule I; Blume, Motions for New Trials in the Federal Courts
(1941) 25 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 1og, III.
41. (1941) ANNUAL PRACE c Order 39, rule z.
42. Clark, English Appellate Procedure (929) 39 YALE L. J. 76, go.
43. Ibid.
44. Id. at 86.
45. Id. at 87.
46. I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 14, at 214, 215.
47. (1928) ANNUAL PRACriCE, Order 58, rule 4.
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tice has been that in cases of verdicts by the jury, the appellate court
is slow to make findings of fact counter to the finding of the jury.45
The English Court of Appeal, though authorized to sit in three
divisions, usually finds two divisions sufficient to handle the cases
before it. Appeals from the King's Bench Division and Probate,
Divorce, and Admiralty Division usually go to one division and appeals
from the Chancery Division to the other. 49 The division handling
chancery appeals is regularly manned by two Chancery judges or bar-
risters and one King's Bench Division judge or barrister. Three
judges must sit together in the appeals from trial orders, decrees or
judgments unless the parties consent to a hearing before two judges.
Appeals from interlocutory orders, decrees, or judgments may be heard
by not less than two judges. 50
I close my discussion of English equity appeals with a feeling of
admiration. Their function and method deserve emulation. Best of
all, they have become the actual pattern for appeals in cases at law.
Today it seems more convenient to speak of English civil appellate
procedure rather than of appellate procedure in law cases and appellate
procedure in equity cases.
II. APPEAL IN THE STATE COURTS
In the eighteenth century the legislature was the highest court of
review of. equity cases in the colonial courts in Delaware, New York
and Rhode Island.5 1 At one period in several states no appeal in
equity cases was possible. However, equity jurisdiction was given to
the highest court with or without concurrent jurisdiction in the main
trial courts in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and Maine.
52
In South Carolina, on the other hand, there were set up circuit courts
of chancery with a Court of Appeals in Equity made up of the circuit
chancellors. 53  In other states there were circuit courts of chancery
with appeals to the general court of review.54
In states with intermediate appellate courts, review of equity cases
has usually been denied to the intermediate court.5 5 Though existent
48. Note (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 971, 977.
49. Kales, The English Judicature Acts (1921) 4 J. Ami. JD. Soc. 133, 136;
Clark, English Appellate Procedure (1929) 39 YALn L. J. 76, 78. See also English
Procedure in Trials and Appeals (1929) 13 J. Am&. JuD. Soc. 117; (1929) 3 CONN.
BAR J. 13.
50. g HALsBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (i9og) 64.
51. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES (1941) 101, 102; POUND, OR-
GANIZATION OF COURTS (1940) 65, 76, 77; ORFIELD, CIamINAI4 APPEALS IN Am[E2ICA
(1939) 9, 215.
52. PoUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS (1940) 134.
53. Id. at 111, 114, 134.
54. Id. at 135.
55. This has been true in Alabama, California, Georgia, Indiana, and Missouri, but
not in Illinois, Louisiana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and
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in Tennessee from 1895 to 1907, there is today no appellate court,
intermediate or otherwise, devoted exclusively to equity cases, ,though
Oklahoma and Texas have separate appellate courts for criminal
cases. There seem to be no compelling reasons for setting up such a
court, particularly in consideration that the experience with separate
criminal appellate courts has not been satisfying.
The past fifty years have seen the passage of numerous state laws
regulating appellate procedure.56 Yet there has been no great uniform-
ity among these statutes. 'In the words of one writer "this department
of procedure remains a highly particularistic one." 17
(a) Method of Resiew
In many states today there exist both the writ of error and the
appeal. The result has been confusing even when the two remedies
have been made concurrent. It has been doubly so where the older
rule that the two remedies are mutually exclusive continues in effect.
In that state of affairs the party seeking review might be forced to
proceed by both methods in close cases. The use o*f both methods was
quite frequent in the former federal practice. To avoid this additional
procedure a number of states have passed statutes combining the two
into a single method designated "appeal". 58 Congress in 1928 59
Texas. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS (1940) 133, 225-241. Cf. Sunderland, The
Problem of Trying Issues (1926) 5 Tsx. L. REv. 18; Curran and Sunderland, Or-
ganization and Operation of Courts of Review (1933) THIRD REPORT OF MICHIGAN
JUDICIAL COUNCIL 57, 161-I75.
Tennessee, a state whose experience has been exceptional, set up a Court of Chan-
cery Appeals in 1895. Acts of 1895, c. 76. It was composed of three judges and was
to pass on such equity cases, other than state revenue cases, as the Supreme Court of
the state might assign to it. In i9o7 the court was increased in size to five and was re-
named the Court of Civil Appeals, and given appellate jurisdiction of other civil cases
up to $Iooo with certain exceptions. Acts of i9o7, c. 82. In 1925 this court was re-
named the Court of Appeals and its jurisdiction still further extended. Acts of 1925,
C. 100.
56. They are collected in Dean Pound's new book, APPELLATE PRCEnUR IN CIvm
CASES (1941).
57. Millar, Notabiia of American Civil Procedure, i887-X937 (1937) 50 HAv. L.
REv. I17, io58. As to equity appeals in the nineteenth century see POUND, APPELLATE
PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES (1941) 289-310.
58. AI z. REv. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 3658; ILL. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd,
1936) c. no, § 198 (I); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick 1935) § 60-3304; MIcH.
COURT RULES (1931, 1933) 55; SEARL, THE 1933 MICHIGAN COURT RULES ANNOTATED
(1933) iii; NEB. COMP. STAT. (1929) §§20-1912 to 20-1914; N. J. S. A. (939) 2:27-
347. As to other states see POUND, APPELLATE PRocEDtR IN CIVIL CASES (1941) 324-
325, 388-389.
It has been stated that because of the jealousy toward equity, the procedure by
writ of error tended to be the model. POUND, op. cit. supra note 56, at 318, 319.
"As for appellate procedure the changes here [U. S.] have been legion, producing
highly diversified systems in different jurisdictions. Notable in this province is the
merger of the common-law writ of error and the chancery appeal, attendant upon the
fused procedure in the United States." Millar, The Old Rigime and the New Civil
in Procedure (1937) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 197, 222.
Professor Sunderland regards the substitution of notice of appeal as a method of
instituting appellate proceedings for the writ of error or appeal as one of the four
main modern elements in an appeal. Observations on the Illinois Civil Practice Act
(1934) 28 ILL. L. REV. 861, 872-873.
59- 45 STAT. 54, 466 (1928), 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 86ia, 86Ib (Supp. 1941).
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sought to substitute the appeal for the writ of error, but accomplished
little, since the appeal in law cases continued to be regulated by the
statutes relating to writs of error, while the appeal in equity cases was
regulated in a different manner.60 It took the new Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to accomplish the fusion.
(b) Time for Appeal
Occasionally time limitations upon equity appeals are shorter than
upon those in law cases. For example, in Maine equity appeals must
be taken within ten days after the decree is filed and notice given to
the parties, although this period may be extended thirty days upon
leave of court in cases where the appellant has neglected by accident
or mistake to perfect the appeal within the time originally limited.61
Writs of error, on the other hand, could be brought at any time within
six years after the entry of the judgment complained of.62 A similar
variance exists in Massachusetts and Tennessee.
6 3
(c) The Record
The common law courts developed a technical sort of record which
included only certain phases of the full proceedings, that is to say, the
process, pleadings, verdict and judgment. The English Chancery
courts developed no such record inasmuch as the method of proceeding
was by written evidence. But in the American state courts oral testi-
mony came to be widely used during the nineteenth century. This
meant that there must of necessity be a certification by the trial court
for purposes of appeal of the evidence taken in open court much like
the bill of exceptions used in cases at law. Since in most jurisdictions
the same judges had both equity and law jurisdictions, the judge in
equity cases was bound to be affected by the idea of a technical record
even before oral testimony came to be used in the equity courts. Hence,
it is not surprising that there are a good many cases devoted to the
question of what constitutes a part of the record on review in equity
appeals. Equity courts, like law courts, have thus regarded interlocu-
tory motions, motions preceding judgment, and affidavits and various
6o. Payne, The Abolition of Writs of Error in the Federal Courts (1929) 15 VA.
L. REv. 305, 318.
6I. M_ REv. STAT. (930) C. 91, §§ 53, 55, 57; Curran and Sunderland, Organiza-
tion and Operation of Courts of Review (1933) THUm REPORT OF MICHIGAN JUDICIAL
COUNCIL 57, 204.
62. ML. REv. STAT. (193o) c. ii6, § IO; Curran and Sunderland, op. cit. supra
note 61, at 206.
63. In Massachusetts, appeals in equity cases must be taken within twenty days
after the entry of the decree, while writs of errors may be brought within six years
after judgment. 2 MASS. GEN. LAws (1932) C. 214, §§ 19, 26; c. 250, § 5.
In Tennessee, sixty days are allowed for equity appeals, and two years for writs
of error. TENN. CODE (1932) §§ 9047, 9069.
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other papers as not within the record proper and so not reviewable
unless included in the bill of exceptions. In a few states statutes have
been passed to overcome this difficulty.
64
The equity courts arrived at an ideal form of appellate record.
Since an appeal is basically a review of a case which has already been
tried, the appellate record logically should consist largely of a copy of
what has already been submitted in the trial court. No changes are
needed; if they are required, their preparation becomes a heavy burden
on the profession. This was the great defect in the bill of exceptions
used in common law cases. The equity courts, on the other hand, in
many jurisdictions substituted for them a transcript of the proceedings
in the trial court. There has been a tendency, particularly in equity
cases,65 for the states to provide that on appeal the whole transcript of
evidence may, at the option of one of the parties or the court, be used
in the record on appeal. Over forty of the states have not required
the narrative record either in equity cases 66 or cases at law.
87
(d) Appeal from Interlocutory Judgments
In the United States the common law rule was that appeal would
lie only from a final judgment.68 This rule is based on common law
decisions involving the writ of error. 9 The history of equity proce-
dure in England shows a wholly different situation. In Blackstone's
time orders and interlocutory decrees were being reviewed just as were
final decrees, 70 even by the House of Lords. The explanation for this
is probably as follows: appeals to the House of Lords from the Lord
Chancellor were established at a fairly late date in legal history, the
latter half of the seventeenth century. Prior to that time cases began
and ended in the same court, review being by way of rehearing before
the Chancellor. It was natural that the Chancellor would review all
64. ILL STAT. ANiv. (Smith-Hurd, 1936) c. IIo, § 198 (2).
65. The states having done so in equity cases and equity cases only are: Massa-
chusetts, 7 AxN. LAWS (Michie, 1933) C. 214, §25, Superior Ct. Rule 76 (1932), and
Note (1925) II MASS. L. Q. 44; Nebraska, State ex rel. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. of
Nebraska v. Colby, 1O7 Neb. 372, 186 N. W. 355 (1922). The whole transcript of
the evidence is transferred with certain formal omissions in equity cases and equity
cases alone in: Alabama, Chancery Rule 84 (1923); Delaware, REV. CODE (1915)
§ 4438.
66. Griswold and Mitchell, The Narrative Record in Federal Equity Appeals
(1929) 42 HAv. L. REV. 483, 5o9, n. 120; Stone, The Record on Appeal in Civil Cases
(937) 23 VA. L. REv. 766, 792.
67. Final Report of the Michigan Procedural Commission (1929) 99.
68. Crick, The Final Judgnent as a Basis for Appeal (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 539,
548. The early rule in Delaware, however, under article 7 of the Constitution of 1792
gave jurisdiction to the appellate court "To receive and determine appeals from inter-
locutory or final decrees of the Chancellor." See Taten v. Gilpin, i Del. Ch. 13
(1816).
69. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal (1932) 41 YALE L. 3. 539,
54'. 70. Id. at 545-548; 3 BL. CoMI . *442-455.
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interlocutory decrees and orders since at first he was the only chancery
judge, the masters being regarded as clerks rather than as judges.
A second possible explanation of chancery review prior to final
decree is that the character of litigation in chancery made early review
desirable. Equity assumed jurisdiction where the legal remedy was
inadequate. This meant that much of its litigation was of a compli-
cated nature. The equity courts made greater use of subordinate offi-
cials and required the documentation of evidence. The equity order
and decree was of a more flexible type. All in all, it was therefore
more convenient to permit interlocutory review.
The common law rule of no review before final judgment was ap-
plied to equity cases by statute at an early date in several jurisdictions.
The Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for appeals from "final
judgment or decrees" exclusively.7 1 In 1830 Ohio and Maryland stat-
utes provided similarly.7 2 In Missouri a statute providing for chancery
appeals when a party was "dissatisfied 'with the determination or
decree" was interpreted as meaning final decree only by way of analogy
with the statute covering appeals at law.73 But there were certain kinds
of cases such as partition and the granting of a receivership for a busi-
ness where serious injury to the parties would ensue if it was necessary
to wait until the whole case had been dealt with. Hence, several states
early provided for interlocutory appeals in certain situations.7 4
If an interlocutory order is reviewed at once it may make later
proceedings unnecessary, as in the case of an order granting a new
trial or an order which in effect determines the writ. Furthermore,
such an appeal may sometimes prevent irreparable injury as in the
cases of granting, refusing or dissolving injunctions. 75 Yet, if appeal
lay as to every order the court might be paralyzed. No absolute answer
is available; experience must be the test.
The reason usually stated for denying interlocutory review has
been that congestion in the appellate court is thus avoided.76 But there
has been much controversy as to when a judgment or decree is final.
This may result in confusion as to the time limit for appeal. Such
controversy would be avoided if interlocutory review were permitted.
Moreover, granted that the rule of interlocutory review saves the appel-
late courts from congestion, it hinders the trial court since the deter-
71. I STAT. 72 (1789).
72. 29 OHIO LAWS 9O (1830) ; MD. LAws (1830) c. 185.
73. Tanner v. Irwin, I Mo. 65 (1821).
74. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal (932) 41 YALE L. J. 539,
553, n. 66. Statutes were passed in Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts and Virginia.
As to the present situation, see POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVnL CASES (1941)
349, 350.
75. Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review (927) 5 TEx. L. REv. 126, 127.
76. Crick, loc. czt. supra note 74, at 557; Proskauer, A New Professio u l Psy-
chology Essential for Law Reform (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 121, 125.
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ruination of a given issue might make a trial unnecessary. In some
cases interlocutory review will also be of great convenience to the par-
ties to the suit. The solution is not necessarily appeal as of right in
all cases before judgment or decree. Is not the answer to b.e found in
discretionary review? Let the trial court or the appellate court decide
what cases shall be reviewed.
77
The United States Supreme Court has stated: "Probably no
question of equity justice has been the subject of more frequent dis-
cussion in this court than the finality of decrees . . . . The cases, it
must be conceded, are not altogether harmonious." 78
(e) Questions Raisable on Appeal
As has been seen, before the Judicature Act of 1873 the English
Appellate Courts did not consider questions not raised in the trial court.
This rule doubtless still prevails in most American courts. One writer
on equity practice has stated: "The general rule with some exceptions
is well settled by numerous decisions that objections will not be con-
sidered by an appellate court in reviewing a case unless they were pre-
sented and insisted on in the court below as shown by the record." 79
Early in the nineteenth century there was a tendency to allow the
question of the adequacy of a legal remedy as barring equitable relief
to be raised in appeal though the question had not been raised in the
trial court. The New York Court in 182o, by Chief Justice Spencer,
stated in reversing a judgment and dismissing a bill in equity on the
ground of lack of equity jurisdiction: "I regret that the bill was not
so framed as to enable the court to put an end to the controversy; but
justice must be administered on established principles, and according
to established forms." s0
Since 182o, however, great changes have occurred. Most courts
have for some time agreed that where a case has been tried in equity,
the question of the adequacy of the legal remedy cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.8 ' The latter rule seems sound. If the objec-
tion had been made at the trial, it could have been corrected by a trans-
fer to the law side of the court even in jurisdictions retaining the for-
mal distinction between law and equity. In the Code states there is
77. POUND, loc. cit. supra note 74; Crick, loc. cit. supra note 74, at 564.
78. McGourkey v. Toledo & Ohio Central Ry., 146 U. S. 536, 544, 545 (1892)
(opinion by Brown, J.).
79. 2 BEACH, MODERN PLEADING AND PRACtiCE IN EQUITY (igoo) § 974. But see
as to the older equity practice, PoUND, op. cit. supra note 74, at 133.
8o. Beeknen v. Frost, 18 Johns. 544, 564 (N. Y. 1820).
8i. City of Omaha v. Venner, 243 Fed. 107 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917) ; Hart v. Oliver,
296 Ill. 209, 129 N. E. 833 (1921) ; Dant & Russell v. Pierce, 122 Ore. 337, 255 Pac.
6o3 (1927) ; POUND, op. cit. supra note 74, at 298; Campbell, Extent to Which Courts
of Review Will Consider Questions Not Properly Raised and Preserved--Part I (1932)
7 Wis. L. REv. 91, IOI.
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even less reason for the rule, since the only reasons there for continu-
ing the distinction between legal and equitable causes of action are the
right to trial by jury in law cases and certain differences in the manner
of appellate review. Waiver of jury trial is increasingly common, and
a jury is often deemed waived when a party goes to trial without objec-
tion. The differences in the method of appellate review are not great
enough to warrant raising the question for the first time on appeal.
In many jurisdictions appellate review in equity cases and jury-waived
cases is almost identical.
s2
A great majority of states hold both in law and in equity cases
that the objection that a complaint fails to state facts sufficient to con-
stitute a cause of action may be considered though first raised on
appeal.8 3 This rule is perhaps faulty, since commonly the defect in
the complaint is the consequence of a careless statement rather than
of basic flaw in the plaintiff's case. Indiana properly repealed the rule
by statute.8 4 Fortunately, the prevailing rule has not been applied to
the question of the sufficiency of an answer or a reply.
Where no objection is taken in the trial court to a nonjoinder of
parties in a law action, the question cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal; and the same rule is usually applied to nonjoinder in suits
in equity. But in those equity cases where the rights of the omitted
parties are so closely connected with the subject matter of the contro-
versy that a final decree cannot be made without materially affecting
those rights, most appellate courts will consider the objection although
it was not raised below.8 5 If the point is well taken, the case is usually
remanded to the trial court vith directions that the plaintiff be per-
mitted to join the necessary parties if he acts within a reasonable pe-
riod."" The objection is heard, however, not for the benefit of the
person raising it, but because a final decree settling the rights of the
parties cannot otherwise be made.
87
Professor Campbell has stated: "The rule that questions not
raised below will not be considered on review applies in equity cases
82. But it has been suggested by the United States Supreme Court that the appel-
late court might in its discretion deem it advisable to raise the objection. Twist v.
Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 274 U. S. 684 (I927), reversing, 6 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 8th,
I925).
83. Campbell, loc. cit. smpra note 8I, at io4, n. 69.
84. Ih. STAT. AN1. (Baldwin, 1934) § 1ii (5).
85. McConnell v. Dennis, i53 Fed. 547 (C. C. A. 8th, io7); Campbell, Extent to
Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions Not Properly Raised and Preserved
-Part II (1932) 7 Wis. L. REv. i6o, Part III (1933) 8 Wis. L. REV. 147, 173.
86. Law v. Neola Elevator Co., 281 Ill. 143, 17 N. E. 435 (1917); Nolan v.
Barnes, 268 Ill. 55, iog N. E. 316 (915); similarly on appeal from an intermediate
court where the question was not there raised.
87. Gulick v. Hamilton, 287 Ill. 367, 122 N. E. 537 (1919).
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as well as in law cases." 88 However, he goes on to say: "But a few
decisions have indicated a more liberal view in the consideration of new
questions in equity cases where the entire proceedings are before the
court for a review of both the law and the facts." 89 The distinction
has value only in those states laying down a rigid rule of review in
cases at law.
In a few jurisdictions statutes have extended the right or duty of
the appellate court to consider new issues, but these statutes have not
differentiated between equity cases and civil actions at law.90 On the
other hand, in a few jurisdictions statutes have restricted the right to
consider new questions without, however, differentiating between equity
and law cases.9 1 An interesting Maryland statute made no express
distinction between law and equity cases. One provision of the Mary-
land Code is that: "In no case shall the court of appeals decide any
point or question which does not plainly appear by the record to have
been tried and decided by the court below." 92 This statute was con-
strued, however, as not applying to equity cases.98  But the Code fur-
ther provides: "On an appeal from a court of equity, no objection to
the competency of a witness, or the admissibility of evidence, or to
the sufficiency of the averments of a bill or petition, or to any account
stated and reported in said cause, shall be made in the court of appeals,
unless it shall appear by the record that such objection was made by
exceptions filed in the court from which such appeal shall have been
taken." 94
It is the prevelant equity rule that only errors properly assigned
will be considered on review.9 5 However, appellate courts are at least
as liberal as they are in considering questions not raised and preserved
below. They will, therefore, consider contentions, although not as-
signed as error, that the complainant fails to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action,9 6 that a necessary party to a bill in equity
88. Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions Not
Properly Raised and Preserved-Part II (1932) 7 Wis. L. REv. 16o, 178. As to the
contrary older equity practice, see POUND, op. cit. mipra note 74, at 133, 298.
89. He cites: National Bank of Commerce v. Rockefeller, 174 Fed. 22 (C. C. A.
8th, gog) ; O'Brien v. Shea, 2o8 Mass. 528, 95 N. E. 99 (Igri) ; Woodward v. Bul-
lock, 27 N. J. Eq. 507 (1875).
go. 28 U. S. C. A. § 391 (1928); WIs. STAT. (1931) § 251.o9; Campbell, Extent
to Which Courts of Rezdew Will Consider Questions Not Properly Raised and Pre-
served-Part III (1933) 8 Wis. L. REv. 147-151.
91. Campbell, loc. cit. mopra note go, at 151-154; Conn. Pub. Acts 1882, c. 50, § 8;
Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § io61.
92. MD. CODE ANN. (Flack, 1939) art. 5, § IO.
93. Wicks v. Westcott, 59 Md. 270 (1882).
94. MD. CODE ANN. (Flack, 1939) art. 5, § 40. The statute was liberally construed
to permit reasonable exceptions in Lowe v. Whitridge, 105 Md. 183, 65 Atl. 926 (197o).
95. Campbell, loc. cit. stpra note go, at 162. But see POUND, op. cit. Mupra note 74,
at 131, 185.
96. Chenoweth v. Budge, 16 Ariz. 422, 145 Pac. 406 (1915).
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was not joined; 97 occasionally it will be heard that equity had no jur-
isdiction because it appeared on the face of the complaint that the
plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. 98 In a number of jurisdic-
tions the statutes 19 or rules of court 100 reserve to the court the power
to consider "plain errors" which are not assigned. Even in the ab-
sence of statute or rule the appellate court has the power to review.
The appellate courts have been as ready to consider questions not
raised in the brief as questions not raised below. They have consid-
ered the sufficiency of a complaint to state a cause of action,10 1 the
nonjoinder of a necessary party in equity, 1 2 and occasionally whether
the plaintiff in an equity action had an adequate remedy at law.
10 3
(f) Reception of New Evidence on Appeal
The common law appellate courts did not admit new evidence on
review, nor did they consider new questions. The chancery courts,
again feeling the cramping influence of the writ of error, were no
readier to do so. Thus the chancery appeal did not constitute a gen-
uine rehearing as it did on the Continent. Furthermore, in a number
of states the conclusive character of findings in law cases resulted in
appeals in equity cases being treated like common law proceedings in
error, where the court would not, in any case consider the weight of
the evidence. The law practice of remanding instead of rendering the
correct judgment in the appellate court affected equity cases. Equity
courts took up the use of assignments of errors and bills of exceptions.
On the other hand, the benefits of the broader scope of appeal in
equity cases were not confined to the equity courts. The common law
courts by way of imitation were persuaded to grant new trials for
obvious and latent errors of fact on the basis of the fiction that such
errors amounted to errors of law.
The superiority of the equity appeal may be readily seen by con-
trasting the weaknesses of the common law writ of error. The com-
mon law writ of error dealt most effectively with the most unimportant
type of question, namely, errors of law in the judgment roll. It dealt
less effectively through the granting of new trials with the errors of
law occurring during the trial and affecting the conduct of the jury.
It did not deal at all with errors of fact.
97. Note v. Morton, 46 Fla. 478, 35 So. 656 (1903).
•8 Williams v. Peeples, 48 Fla. 316, 37 So. 572 (1904).
gg. N B. CoPi. STAT. (1929) §2o-1919.
Ioo. Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States (ig3) Rule 27 (6).
IOr. Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 Pac. 408 (1915).
102. Clayton & Tyson v. Henley, 32 Gratt. 65 (Va. 1879). This question has
never been considered when just raised in a motion for a rehearing. Weightman v.
Washington Critic Co., 4 App. Cas. (D. C.) 136, 147 (1894).
IO3. Williams v. Peeples, 48 Fla. 316, 37 S. W. 572 (1904).
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In several states the powers of the appellate court-have been en-
larged to permit the reception of new evidence, thus permitting the
widest possible review of the facts.10 4 This will often make unneces-
sary the remand of a case to clear up some point left in doubt by the
evidence at the trial, or to furnish by obviously available means some
gap in the proof. But the difficulty here in law cases has been that of
the guaranty of trial by jury. Hence, Massachusetts has limited it to
the case of error arising from '"omission at the trial of some fact
which, under the circumstances of the case, may subsequently be proved
without involving any question for a jury." 105 Illinois in 1933 fol-
lowed, in substance, the Massachusetts rule.10 6
(g) Scope of Review in Jury-Waived Law Cases.
It is interesting to observe the course of American doctrine as to
the scope of review in jury-waived cases. In some states there were
statutes declaring that findings should be made and should have the
same force and effect as the verdict of a jury. This was true in New
York 10 7 and Kentucky.' 08  In North Carolina such a provision was
even incorporated into the constitution of the state.' 09 The federal
courts were once governed by a statute to the same effect. 110 In these
jurisdictions the review in jury-waived cases could not become like
that in equity cases.
But in many states no such statutes or constitutional provisions
barred the way. If they made any provision at all for findings or con-
clusiveness of facts, they did not further specify what effect they
should have. Hence, the courts might have applied the equity doctrine
concerning the scope of, review, giving the findings of fact no more
weight than the recitals in an equity decree. There was nothing sacred
about the decision of the judge upon the facts. But the courts by judi-
cial construction imposed upon themselves restrictions which the leg-
islature had omitted to lay down."'-
To overcome this judicial construction a number of state legis-
latures passed statutes expressly authorizing a full review of both the
facts and the law in jury-waived cases. But even this did not bring
104. Up to 1928 California, Kansas and Michigan had made provision for the tak-
ing of additional evidence on appeal. Note (1928) i6 CALir. L. REy. 5oo, 52r. See
CALiF. CONST., art. VI, § 4Y4; VAN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, 1935) § 36o-3316; MICE.
CoMP. LAWS (1915) § i2,o34. As to the present rules see POUND, op. cit. supra note
74, at 368, 369.
,o. Mass. Acts 1913, c. 716, § 3, MASS. G=s. LAws (1932) c. 231, § 125.
io6. ILL. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 5936) c. no, § 216 (I) (d).
107. N. Y. Laws (1852) c. 392, § 268, amending, N. Y. Laws (I1849) c. 438, § 268.
io8. Ky. CODE (Rev. 1876) § 331 (2).
sog. N. C. CONST., art. IV, § 13.
IIO. 28 U. S. C. A. § 773 ( 928).
iii. State Bank v. Conway, 13 Ark. 344 (5853).
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about the desired reform in all such jurisdictions. In Connecticut the
appellate court ruled that it had no constitutional power to review
questions of fact since it. was expressly designated by the state con-
stitution as a "Court of Errors". Such a title showed "the conviction
of the people that a jurisdiction of mixed law and fact, vested in any
court of last resort, exercising a supreme and uncontrolled power, was
inconsistent with a sound system of jurisprudence, and was dangerous
to the administration of justice." 112 The same constitutional argu-
ment was applied in South Carolina.113 The Oregon court interpreted
the language of the state constitution as being merely permissive as to
review of the facts."14
Fortunately a number of courts accepted the extension of the
scope of review, For example, in Washington such a statute has been
in force for more than forty years, and the courts have applied the
English doctrine. Law actions without a jury and equity actions are
treated exactly alike. In both cases a finding will be reversed if there
is a preponderance of evidence against it.115
California in 1927 passed the most far-reaching state statute allow-
ing final power in the appellate court to dispose of a case without
remanding. The statute 116 was made possible by a 1926 amendment
to the state constitution. 117 The statute provided that in all cases
"where a jury is not a matter of right, or where jury has been waived",
the appellate court may make findings of fact contrary to, or in addi-
tion to, those made by the trial court, and so may take new evidence
of events any time before decision, and may make final judgment. In
fact, the statute expressly declares that it is to be construed liberally
to avoid retrials. It has been frequently applied. 118
About one-third of the states have extended the equity scope of
review to jury-waived cases.119 Possibly an even larger group fol-
low the older doctrine of one scope in equity case and another in cases
at law whether the jury is waived or not. However, they sometimes
112. Styles v. Tyler, 64 Conn. 432, 451, 30 Atl. 165, 171, 172 (1894) (two judges
dissenting).
113. Land Mortgage Co. v. Faulkner, 45 S. C. 503, 5o6, 507, 24 S. E. 288, 290
(x896).
114. Frederick & Nelson v. Bard, 66 Ore. 259, 134 Pac. 318, 320 (1913).
115. Rankin v. Blanc, 143 Wash. 22, 254 Pac. 254 (927).
x16. CALIF. CODES AND GE. LAWS (Supp. 1927) § 956a.
117. CALIF. CONST., art. VI, § 43/.
Ix8. Note (932) 20 CALIF. L, REv. II ; Note (1928) I6 CALIF. L. REV. 500;
(1936) 24 CALIF. L. REV. 733; (1930) 3 So. CALIF. L. REV. 351; (1928) I So. CALMF.
L. REy. 387.
i9. Clark and Stone, Review Of Findings of Fact (I937) 4 U. OF CH. L. R V.
190, 215. The note to Rule 68 of the Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure lists: Alabama, California, Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington,
West Virginia and Wisconsin; with, however, some doubt as to California and Wash-
ington. *As to the scope of review thirty years ago see (I91O) REP. LA. BAR ASS'N 39,
40, 53, 65, 87, 88.
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construe away the distinction by a wide application of the presump-
tion in favor of the trial court's finding, so that in effect the law
scope is followed. A third group, consisting of eight or nine states,
has completely assimilated the review of equity cases to that of the
law.1
20
One argument offered for limiting the scope of equity review in
the state courts is the tendency of the states to require special find-
ings.121 However, Illinois,122 and Michigan 12 8 have dropped the re-
quirement of findings of fact. Moreover, in seven states there is no
express statutory provision or court rule concerning special findings.'124
A majority of states have definite provisions concerning findings in
both jury-waived and equity cases.' 25 In about nineteen states there
is a definite requirement that the court must make special findings of
fact in writing and state them separately from the conclusions of law.
In about twenty other states it is the rule that the court may make
special findings of fact and must do so where requested by the parties.
One method of empowering an appellate court to dispose of a
case without remanding is the passage of a statute providing that where
the findings of fact of the trial court are assigned as error the appel-
late court may make new findings and render final judgment on them.' 26
Even though statutes do not expressly provide that cases tried to a
jury shall not be included within their scope, it is always held that if
the finding of fact were made below- by a jury, the constitutional jury
safeguard bars the appellate court from substituting its own findings
on appeal.'
27
An outstanding virtue of appeals in equity is that remand for
new trial is seldom necessary, since the appellate court reviews the
facts. This is doubly true if the appellate court is given the power
12o. Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Carolina and Pennsylvania.
121. Clark and Stone, loc. cit. supra note 119, at 205. But see Sunderland, Find-
ings of Fact and Coiclusions of Law in Cases Where Juries Are Waived (1937) 4 U.
OF CH. L. REv. 218, 221, arguing that the great variety of statutes shows no such pol-
icy involved.
122. ILL. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. IiO, § I88 (2).
123. MicH. CoURT RuLES (1933) rule 37, § II.
124. Delaware, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Virginia and West Vir-
ginia.
125. Clark and Stone, Review of Findings of Fact (1937) 4 U. OF CHI. L. REV.
190, 206.
126. Note (1929) 38 YALE: L. J. 971, 973, n. 8. The Nebraska statutes so provide
in equity cases. Nza. Comp. STAT. (1929) § 20-1925. The Montana statutes are to the
same effect, while those of Alabama, California, Indiana, North Dakota and Oregon
include cases at law as well.
Arguably a statute of this kind should permit the appellate court to consider oral
evidence not submitted below. (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 570. But the Nebraska court has
construed the statute as requiring merely a consideration of the trial record. Miksch
v. Tassler, io8 Neb. 2o8, 187 N. W. 796 (1922).
127. First National Bank v. Crawford, 78 Neb. 665, i1 N. W. 587 (19o7); Wig-
field v. Atridge, 2o7 Ala. 56o, 93 So. 612 (1922).
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to hear new evidence on appeal. This saving of time and expense
may be carried over into jury-waived cases. Thus it should be only
in cases tried by jury that the need of a new trial should be common.
The need of remand for new trial in one class of cases, namely,
those involving the preservation of excluded evidence in the appellate
record, has been avoided in equity in a number of states by statute.
Statutes in Michigan 128 and Oregon 129 have provided that where tes-
timony is excluded in chancery cases the party offering it may have
it taken down in the same fashion as testimony admitted, but may
have it specially marked and separately preserved in the appellate rec-
ord. There is no good reason why this cannot be done in law cases
where the jury is waived. It may be done in jury cases but involves
the absence of the jury during the giving of such testimony.' 30
(h) Recent Reform
Recent procedural developments in the state judicial systems have
not been extensive. They were confined largely to the perfection of
such special devices as the summary judgment, the declaratory judg-
ment, and discovery before trial.131 The Illinois Civil Practice Act with
respect to appellate procedure was limited to improving the mechanics
of review.' 32 It sought to substitute a broader appeal in place of the
former methods of review, particularly for the appeal and the writ of
error. 33 It sought to abolish the old technical distinction between the
record proper and the transcript of proceedings in the trial itself.' 3 4
Under the former practice, the latter had been called a "certificate of
evidence" in equity and a "bill of exceptions" in cases at law. Under
the new rule, all differences between parts of the record were abol-
ishd and all documents before the court on appeal might be considered
for all purposes. It further provided that in cases tried without a
jury no special findings of fact by the trial court are necessary to sup-
port the judgment or decree.' 3 5 This altered the rule previously applied
in equity cases that the decree must recite every fact ncessary to sup-
port it, the old rule thus placing the burden of making the record on
review upon the successful party in the trial court. But no change was
128. MIcH. Comp. LAWS (1915) § 12,493. See Blume, Problem of Preserving Ex-
cluded Evidence in the Appellate Record (1929) 13 MiN. L. REV. 169, 175-176.
129. Ore. Laws I925, c. 8o.
13o. Truslow v. State, 95 Tenn. 189, 19g8, 31 S. W. 987, 989 (1895).
131. Clark, The New Illinois Civil Practice Act (1933) I U. OF ClfI. L. REv. 209.
132. Id. at 219. See also Jenner and Schaefer, The Proposed Illnois Civil Prac-
tice Act (1933) I U. OF CL L. REV. 49, 64-70,
133. ILL. Civ. PRAc. Acr, § 74 et seq. The old distinctions are set out in DODD AND
EDMUNDS, ILLINois APPELLATE PROCEDURE (1929) § 180.
134. ILL. Civ. PRAC. Acr, § 74 (2).
135. Id. at § 64 (2) and (3).
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made as to the power of the appellate courts to review facts. The Su-
preme Court could thus still review the facts in all chancery cases,
but could not do so in jury-waived cases. Thus, no uniform system
was devised for equity and jury-waived cases. The Act did not include
the solution, which Federal Circuit Judge Charles E. Clark favors, of
a chancery review with as limited scope as a legal review. The appel-
late court was, however, empowered to "give any judgment and make
any order which ought to have been given or made". 138 It was also
empowered to grant amendments and receive further testimony in the
appellate court.'
3 7
The new Michigan court rules of 1931 introduced some desired
reforms in appellate procedure. The procedure for appeal in jury-
waived cases was made identical with that in equity cases.13 Thus
in jury-waived cases the appellant could assign error on the ground
that the decision was against the preponderance of the evidence. More-
over, a single method of appeal, notice of appeal, was adopted for all
cases.' 39  The narrative form of record was abolished, 140 and the par-
ties were to designate the contents of the record.
141
(i) Effect of Jury Trial on Appeal Under the Codes.
Dean Leon Green has said: "The difficulties of evidence, instruc-
tions, new trials, appellate review, and the abuses which arise from
crowded dockets, excessive costs, unethical practices, and most of the
other t'roublesome incidents of the judicial process result primarily from
jury trial." 142
In jury cases a large proportion of reversals is for error in instruc-
tions. This danger is not present in equity because no instructions are
given. 143  Similarly, many jury cases are reversed for error in the
admission of evidence. But in equity cases, the absence of a jury
causes a less rigid application of the rules of evidence. Thus, there
136. Id. at § 92 (f).
137. Id. at § 92 (a) - (d). Such testimony may be admitted "where evidence has
been erroneously excluded or where there has been an omission of proof at the trial of
some facts, which, under the circumstances of the case, may subsequently be proved
without involving any question for a jury and without substantial injustice to either
party.
138. Sunderland, The New Michigan Court Rulev (1931) 29 MIcH. L. REV. 586,
595. See Rule 37, § ii. As to recent improvements in other states see POUND, APPEL-
LATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES (1941) 321-376.
139. MICH. COURT RULES, 55, 57.
140. Id., 59, § 3 (e).
141. Id., 59, 62.
I42. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930) 375.
143. Chief Justice Lamm of the Supreme Court of Missouri stated in Lee v. Lee,
258 Mo. 599, 604, 167 S. W. 1030 (1914) : "To offer instructions in a cause in chancery
is like carrying owls to Athens, coals to Newcastle, herring to Holland, gilding refined
gold. The unbending rule of practice is that instructions fill no office at all in an equity
case; hence, for appellate purposes, error cannot be predicated or assigned upon the giv-
ing or refusing of them."
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should be fewer reversals in equity cases for rulings on points of
evidence.
As has been seen, the Federal Constitution and the state constitu-
tions make the complete fusion of law and equity difficult by providing
for the preservation of jury trialin cases of a common law nature. If
the use of the jury trial could be cut down, the two systems could be
brought closer together. We cannot, of course, proceed directly by
statute to that end, as has recently been done'in England. 144 But we
may proceed indirectly to discourage the use of jury trial. One way
is by the passage of legislation making the right to a jury dependent
on a prior written demand. 145 Another is by legislation exacting as
a further condition of the right the payment of a special jury fee.' 46
Amendment of the state constitutions to abolish the right of jury trial
in all civil cases should be attempted.
Writing in 1936, Professor Sidney P. Simpson predicted: "From
a purely procedural standpoint, it seems reasonably certain that equity
as a separate system will have practically disappeared from the United
States within another fifty years." '4
Professor Walter Wheeler Cook, however, in his 194o "One Vol-
ume Edition of Cases on Equity" republishes this striking statement
made by him in 1931 concerning equity appeals:
"It must not be imagined, however, that in the so-called Code
states the distinction between common law and equity cases has
entirely disappeared. The reasons for the preservation of the dis-
tinction are numerous. One is, doubtless, the traditional conserva-
tism of the legal profession and its clinging tenaciously to habits
of thought and ways of looking at things which are embedded in
all the literature of the subject for centuries. For example, the
recent 'reform' of English property law speaks of certain titles
being good 'at law' and of others as taking effect 'only in equity'-
this over half a century after the fusion under the judicature acts.
Of perhaps more importance is the fact that in many of the code
states the distinction is preserved by legislative or constitutional
enactment. To understand this it must be noted that historically
common law and equity procedure, inter alia, differed in two ways:
in the mode of trying issues of fact and in the types of appellate
review. At common law the issues of fact were tried by the court
and, originally, entirely on the basis of written evidence-answers
to interrogations and depositions made under oath-and the chan-
cery appeal was in substance tried de novo by the appellate court
of the questions of fact as well as of law. The latter difference
was due largely to the fact that as the evidence was written the
144. 23 & 24 GEo. V, C. 36, § 6 (1933).
145. ILL. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1936) c. IIO, § i88 (I).
146. CALIF. CODE CIv. PRoc. (Dewey, 193) § 631.
147. Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity (1936) 5o HAgv. L. Riv. 171, 248.
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higher court could pass on it as well as the trial court, whereas
in the common law case the triers of fact, the jury, had seen the
witnesses. While formally the distinction between action at law
and writ in equity is abolished by the codes, in essence it is usu-
ally retained by provisions such, for example, as that found in
Connecticut, that all issues of fact which prior to the code were
triable to a jury shall remain so triable and all issues of fact for-
merly triable to the court shall remain so triable. In addition, in
some states by statute or constitutional provision the distinctions
as to the kind of appellate review is also retained and chancery
suits are reviewed by appeal instead of by writ of error. So long
as constitutions and statutory provisions retain jury trial in civil
cases as at common law and court trial in chancery or equity cases,
and corresponding differences in appellate review, the distinction
between law and equity is not abolished. Much can be done and
has been done by wise provisions encouraging waiver of jury
trials; but not until these constitutional and statutory require-
ments referred to are done away with and something like the
more flexible English system is adopted can a real fusion of law
and equity take place. Even then, of course, the distinction
between action for damages and specific relief will continue, but
there will be no need to call one common law and the other
equitable relief." 148
III. APPEAL IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Article III, Section 2 of the Federal Constitution gives the
Supreme Court of the United States appellate jurisdiction, both as to
law and fact with such exceptions and under such regulations as Con-
gress might make. This section was subjected to bitter attack. It
was asserted that this provision abrogated the right to trial by jury
and made all cases reviewable de novo as in equity. The result of this
criticism was the adoption of the Seventh Amendment providing that
"no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of
the United States than according to the rules of common law." This
provision meant that facts found by a jury in civil cases 149 at law
were put beyond the examination of the appellate court and review of
jury cases was confined to matters of law, while review in equity cases
continued to embrace both law and fact.
(a) The Record-Law and Equity
At the beginning of the federal judicial system all cases, both at
law and in equity, were brought to the Supreme Court by writ of
148. COOK, CASES Ol" EQuITY (3d ed. 1940) 12-13, quoting Cook, Equity, in 5
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF' SOCIAL SCIENCE (193) 586-587. At p. 65, n. 20, of his casebook,
Professor Cook refers to some of the leading state court decisions.
149. For a claim that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to criminal cases see
Shapiro, Criminal Appeal on the Facts and the Federal Judicial System (1939) 34 ILL.
L. REV. 332.
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error.150 All were heard upon a statement of the facts by the judge
or parties, and not upon a full record.151 This was the rule for
fourteen years.
By the Act of March 3, 18o3, specific provision was made for
appeal in cases in equity and cases involving admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction.152  Upon such appeal there was to be transmitted to the
Supreme Court a transcript of the libel, bill, answer, depositions, and
all other proceedings in the case. All oral testimony was to be stated
verbatim.15 From 18o3 up to 1938 the records on appeal in law
cases and in equity cases were regulated as to form and contents by
different rules, based on the scope of appellate review. According to
Professor Stone, the "first and probably the most important deter-
minent" in the form of the settled record has been the historical differ-
ence in the scope of appellate review between law cases and suits in
equity.
1 54
A second reason for the difference in the record between law and
equity cases in the federal courts has been the contrasting methods of
presenting and taking evidence and testimony in the two types of
cases. The English practice, since reformed, 15 5 and the American
practice in equity courts prior to the Judiciary Act were that the tes-
timony in equity cases was presented to the trial court by deposition
instead of by oral testimony. The Judiciary Act altered this by pro-
viding that the mode of proof by oral testimony and examination of
witnesses in open court should be the same in all federal courts in all
federal cases whether in equity or at law.'56 This provision conform-
ing the equity method of testimony to that in law cases was the law
from 1789 to 18o2. In thd latter year an act of Congress provided
that the court in its discretion might order the testimony of witnesses
taken by depositions upon request of either party. 157 There was thus
an opening wedge for dispensing with oral testimony in equity cases.
The disparity between law and equity cases was increased in 1842
when the Supreme Court, acting under authority of an act of Con-
gress of 1842,:1r3' laid down rules under which examination by deposi-
150.1 STAT. 244 (789); Poumw, APPE-AE PRocEDTau IN Civm CASES (1941)
289-290.
151. i STAT. 83 (1789).
152. 2 STAT. 244 (1803).
153. Where the oral testimony appeared in the form of notes of the judge, the
court reversed for further proof. Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 5 Pet. 449
(U. S. 1830).
154. Stone, The Record on Appeal in Civil Cases (0937) 23 VA. L. REV. 766, 769.
ii5. The Operation of the Reformed Equity Procedure in England (1912) 26
HA•v. L. REv. 99, 104-105.
156. I STAT. 88 (789). No express repeal of this provision occurred until 1874.
REv. STAT., §§ 862, 5596.
157. 2 STAT. 166 (i80o).
158. 5 STAT. 518 (x842).
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tions and commission became the ordinary method, while examination
by oral testimony in open court became a matter of discretion in the
court.5 9 In 1861 the gulf became even greater when the court laid
down a rule that even the oral testimony was to be no longer taken in
open court but before an examiner on hearing who copied the testimony
in narrative form except in situations where the question and answer
form could more dearly present the statements of the witnesses.160
The Equity Rules of 1912 changed all this, however, by restoring
the rule in effect from 1789 to 18o2. Rule 46 provided that the exam-
ination of witnesses and the rulings on objections to evidence should
be the same in suits in equity as in actions at law. Thus, from 1802
to 1912 the matters which have composed the record on appeal in
equity cases has differed from that at law. In equity cases during that
period, most of the evidence appeared in written depositions which
were sent up in their entirety to the appellate court for reexamination.
In law cases, on the other hand, the testimony was given orally in open
court, and was taken down either by the reporter or as judge's notes,
and presented to the appellate court by bill of exception.
During most of the history of the federal courts the question and
answer form of record was the rule for both oral and written evidence.
From 1789 to 1803, as has been seen, a brief narrative statement was,
however, all that went to the appellate court. But from 1803 to 1861
everything appeared verbatim. In 186I there was a reversion to the
narrative form as to oral evidence. But from 189I to 1912 the ques-
tion and answer method was again used in all cases. Thus the narra-
tive record had been tested twice and twice abandoned in favor of a
fuller record' 61
(b) The Struggle for a Unified Scope of Review
The most important and difficult problems in securing a union of
law and equity in the federal courts concerned the preservation of the
right to trial by jury as guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment. Not
quite so important and yet deserving of great care were problems con-
cering the manner of appeal and the scope of review. 1
62
From 18oo to 1865 there were no successful attempts to estab-
lish a united system of review at law and in equity.'6 3 In 186 5 an
159. i How. xxxix (U. S. 184T). See also 17 Peters lxi (U. S. 1842), an unofficial
volume not found in the small collection of United States Supreme Court Reports, in
which they were originally presented. The rules are set out in HOPKiS, FxoEaaAL
EQUmTY RuLs (8th ed. 1933) 43-61.
i6o. Amendment to Equity Rule 67, 1 Black 6 (U. S. 1861).
161. Griswold and Mitchell, The Narrative Record in Federal Equity Appeals
(1929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 483, 48g.
162. Clark and Stone, Review of Findings of Fact (937) 4 U. OF CHL L. REv.
19o.
163. Id. at 197.
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act of Congress provided for trial by the court of cases at law without
a jury.164  But review was interpreted to be the same as in jury
cases. 165  Thus the law method of review, not the equity method,
became the pattern for jury-waived cases at law.
The increasing congestion in the federal courts led to demands
for limiting the scope of review. Admiralty review as under the
First Judiciary Act was limited in 1875 to a determination of ques-
tions of law arising on the record.16 6 Attorney General Garland
urged upon Congress the extension of the same limited scope of review
to equity cases. 167  The pressure on the Supreme Court was, however,
relieved in 1891 when the circuit courts of appeal were established.
The practice again became to review the entire record in admiralty as
well as equity cases. No findings of fact were required as a foundation
for review. In 1930 the Supreme Court by amendment of the equity
rules laid down a rule in equity and admiralty requiring separate find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law to be stated. 168 According to
Professor and now Justice Frankfurter this restored the limited scope
of review of 1789.169
The Equity Rules of 1912 dealt with matters of review. They
covered the preparation of the record on appeal and also the effect of
error.170 As has been seen, they restored the requirement of a narra-
tive statement of testimony in equity records. The critics were at
first not unreceptive to such change.'17  But within the space of a year
criticism commenced. One writer pointed out that evidence which
appeared in narrative form has a wholly different probative effect from
that appearing in question and answer form and that frequently it was
extremely expensive to reduce the evidence into form agreeable to all
parties.
172
The equity practice as prescribed by Federal Equity Rule 75 was,
however, comparatively liberal and simple.178 On the other hand, the
practice concerning bills of exception had become technical in some
respects. While it is true that equity practice prescribed a narrative
164. 13 STAT. 501 (I865), 28 U. S. C. A., §§ 773, 875 (1928).
165. Flanders v. Tweed, 9 Wall. 425 (U. S. i869).
166. i8 STAT. 315 (1875).
167. REP. ATY. GEN. (1885) 42; id. (1886) 18; id. (1887) xv; id. (1888) xiv;
Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Suprewe Court at Term, 1929 (1930) 44
HARv. L. REv. 1, 30.
168. FED. EQurnr Ruirs, 7o/2.
169. Frankfurter and Landis, loc. cit. supra note 167, at 32.
17o. FED. EQurrY RULES 46, 70Y2 (as amended Nov. 25, 1938) 72, 75-77. With
these rules compare, FED. RuLrs CiV. PRoc. 43, 52, 6o, 61, 75, 76.
171. Bunker, The New Federal Equity Rules (913) ii Mica. L. REV. 435, 451. It
was thought that the great bulk of the appellate records would be reduced and expense
saved.
172. Lane, One Year Under the New Federal Equity Rules (1914) 27 HAV. L.
Ray. 629, 642.
173. Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure (I935) 44 YALE L. J. 387,
431.
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record, subject to the exception that testimony might be set forth ver-
batim when necessary to a sound appreciation of such testimony,
174
yet the practice in law cases was the same, since Rule 8 of the Supreme
Court relative to bills of exceptions required the narrative form, "save
as a proper understanding of the questions presented may require that
parts of it be set forth otherwise." 171 Thus the procedures for review
were about identical in form.
The Federal Equity Rules of 1912 did not directly change the
divided form of review. Equity cases were still reviewed in one way,
and law cases in another with respect to scope of review. However,
Federal Equity Rule 46 restored the provision of the First Judiciary
Act of 1789 that the testimony of witnesses in all equity trials should
be taken in open court except in certain limited cases, and. that the court
should, as in actions at law, pass on the admissibility of all evidence.
Thus, less argument could be made against the adoption by equity of
the law scope of review. The appellate court could less effectively
review questions as to the credibility of witnesses than as to written
documents.
The Act of Congress of 1928 which abolished the writ of error
and substituted appeal, thus seeming to take over the equity practice
into cases at law, was soon interpreted as a change of name only.
176
(c) Unification and the New Federal Rules
Prior to the new federal rules there were five methods for pre-
paring records on appeal in federal civil actions.' 77 In actions at law
the method was by bill of exceptions. Such a bill contained only so
much of the evidence as was necessary to present clearly the question
of law involved in the rulings to which exceptions were reserved. The
evidence was set forth in condensed and narrative form. A number
of states employed bills of exceptions in cases at law. England has
long ago abandoned them.' The new. federal rules dispense with
them.' 79  The other four methods of preparing records on appeal in
civil cases prior to the new rules were: (i) the judge-made record,
(2) the record made by direction of the parties or their counsel, (3)
the record made by the parties and court, and (4) the clerk-made rec-
174. FED. EQurry RULES 75 (b). The rule is construed in Barber Asphalt Paving
Co. v. Standard Asphalt & Rubber Co., 275 U. S. 372 (1928).
175. The rule is set out in 286 U. S. 598 (1932).
T76. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA (1939) 244; Payne, The Abolition
of Writs of Error in the Federal Courts ((1929) I5 VA. L. REv. 305.
177. Stone, The Record on Appeal in Civil Cases (I937) 23 VA. L. REV. 766, 773-781.
178. Sunderland, An Appraisal of English Procedure (1925) 11 A. B. A. J. 773.
179. Unfortunately they still exist in appeals in criminal cases. Moore and Adel-
son, The Supreme Court, z938 Term (1940) 26 VA. L. REv. 697, 700. See Criminal
Appeal Rule IX.
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ord. The Federal Equity Rules of 1912 used the method of the rec-
ord made by the parties and the court.180 The new federal rules 75
and 76 are based largely on the old equity rule.
When the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure pre-
pared the new rules concerning appeal one of their purposes was to
provide a record for the appellate court which could be used under
the new joined procedure either for cases formerly in equity or writs
formerly at law.' 8 ' At the same time they wished to provide a record
which could be simply and inexpensively prepared as in states having
modernized code procedure. They also wished to provide a record
which would present the question to the court comprehensively and yet
not overburden the court with superfluous matter.
While under the Equity Rules of 1912 182 it was the requirement
that there be a narrative statement of the testimony of witnesses in
the record on appeal, the new civil rules permit a question and answer
record.'8 3 If a narrative record is prepared, the other party may object
and have the question and answer form substituted. The advantages
of the question and answer form are (i) speedy preparation, (2) a
more accurate picture of what happened below, and (3) cheapness in
preparation.'8 4
The new federal rules abolish the old distinction in law cases
between the record proper and the proceedings and evidence on the
trial, and the method of bringing matters not of "strict record" into
the record on appeal becomes unnecessary.' 85  Assignment of errors
as a prerequisite of review is no longer necessary. Summons and
severance as a method of giving notice to co-parties are abolished.
The Act of 1934 186 gave the Supreme Court the power to unite the
law and equity procedure. According to Dean and now Judge Charles
E. Clark, Reporter for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "Prob-
ably the greatest obstacle to this union, next to the question of jury
trial, is the traditional difference in method of review of equity and
x8o. FE. EQuITr RULES 75, 77. The 1912 rules are set out in 226 U. S. 649-673
(1913). Federal Equity Rule 75 was amended May 31, 1932, to relieve litigants of the
necessity of putting expert testimony in narrative form for the purposes of appeal.
18r. Stone, The Record on Appeal in Civil Cases (1937) 23 VA. L. REV. 766, 784.
182. FED. EQurry Rm.Es 75 (b).
183. FED. RULES CrV. PROC. 75 (c).
184. ORiELu , CRIMINAL APEALS IN AMERICA (1939) 142-147.
I85. Ilsen and Hone, Federal Appellate Practice as Affected by the New Rules of
Civil Procedure (1939) 24 MiNN. L. Rxv. 1, 48. Professor Sunderland lists this as
one of the four main elements or stages in a modem appellate proceeding. The New
Michigan Court Rules (1931) 29 MiCH. L. REv. 586, 595; Observations on the Illinois
Civil Practice Act (1934) 28 ILL. L. REv. 861, 872. The other three elements listed
are: Use of notice of appeal instead of writ of error or appeal, serving notice of appeal
on all parties alike and abolition of stmmons and severance as a method of serving co-
appellants, and setting out grounds of appeal in the briefs and abolition of separate as-
signments of errors.
x86. 48 STAT. 1O64 (1934), 28 U. S. C. A., §§ 723 (b), 723 (c) (i94i).
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law cases." 187 It is true that legislation had very largely assimilated
the procedure for review into a single type. The first step was to make
harmless the taking of an appeal when a writ of error was proper or
vice versa. The next step occurred in 1928 when the writ of error
was abolished and the appeal substituted.
But these changes did not deal with the important problem of the
scope of review. The problem of the scope could be approached in
three ways. There could be retained the old federal rule that in jury-
waived law cases the findings of fact should have the same effect as
the verdict of a jury in an action at law, while in equity cases the find-
ings of fact should be reviewable as to the weight of the supporting
evidence as well as the sufficiency. But this did not unite appellate
review in law and in equity. A second solution was to apply the scope
of review in equity cases to jury-waived cases. The third solution was
to apply the jury rule to equity and jury-waived cases. The second
solution made the equity rule the new single rule for all cases not
involving a jury. The third solution made the jury rule the new
single rule for all cases.
The new federal rules introduce no change in the scope of review
as to questions of law. It should be observed, however, that a party
need not take exceptions in order to have a question for review.',,
Instead, it is sufficient to make reasonable objections or to make appro-
priate motions, making the objections specific, and setting forth in each
instance the grounds for any motion presented.
But in non-jury law cases a great change has been made in the
scope of review- on questions of fact. As to jury cases, the new rules
do not change the scope; as before, the appellate court may not review
the facts. It may, of course, review the question as to whether there
was substantial evidence to maintain the verdict, since that is a ques-
tion of law and not a question of fact. Even in this situation, a motion
for a directed verdict must be made at the close of the entire case.18 9
Neglect to make such a motion is treated as an admission that there
was sufficient evidence to justify the submission of the case to a jury.
Furthermore, to be effective the motion must state the specific grounds
upon which it is based.
Prior to the new rules, the findings of the trial judge in non-jury
actions at law were not reviewable on the facts. The appellate court
could only pass on whether or not the findings were supported by sub-
stantial evidence; thus, the scope of review was no broader than that
187. Clark, Power of the Suprevw Court to Make Rdes of Appellate Procedure
(1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 1303, 1319.
88. FES. RULES CIV. PROC. 46.
i89. Baten v. Kirby Lumber Corp., lO3 F. (2d) 272 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
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in jury cases. In equity cases, on the other hand, the findings of the
court were reviewable on the facts. The appellate court could review
the weight of the evidence, though as mentioned above, there was a
rather powerful presumption in favor of the action of the trial judge.
It was, of course, wholly illogical that the findings of the trial judge
should be treated differently in one type of action than in another type
of action. The distinction was based on history rather than logic.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure appear to extend the equity
scope of review to jury-waived cases. The Supreme Court Advisory
Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure early saw the need of a uni-
form rule for equity cases and jury-waived cases.-1 0 There was a
good deal of discussion as to whether the law rule or the equity rule
should be adopted. The Advisory Committee selected the equity rule
and the Supreme Court approved it. It should be noted, however, that
under Rule 52 (a) the findings of fact are not to be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and that due regard is to be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge of the credibility of witnesses. The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held in an opinion by
Judge Parker that the present rule as to the review of findings is sim-
ply a reembodiment of the old equity rule on the subject.191 In the
Notes to the Rules of Civil Procedure it is stated that Rule 52 "accords
with the decisions on the scope of the review in modern federal equity
practice." 192
(d) Equity Scope v. Law Scope
Federal Circuit Judge Charles E. Clark favored assimilating the
scope of equity review to that in law cases.' 93 His notion is that the
review in an equity case cannot be to any real extent, and should not
be, a revaluation of the testimony of witnesses who appeared at the
trial. This would impose too heavy a burden on the appellate courts
and a task they are not fitted to accomplish. Furthermore, the appel-
late court has rather great freedom in cases at law because of the shad-
19o. For authorities favoti'hg the equity scope see PouND, APPEL.ATE PRocmIuJm
IN CIVIM CASES (1941) 222, 300, 370; Blume, Review of Facts in Non-Jury Cases
(1936) 2o J. Am. Jtm. Soc. 68; Holtzoff, Practice Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (1940) 2o B. U. L. REV. 390; Sunderland, The Scope of Judicial Review
(Bar Proc. 1938) 17 NEB. LAw BULL. 228, 240. Contra: Clark and Stone, Review
of Findings of Fact (937) 4 U. OF Cmr. L. RLT. i9o; Ilsen and Hone, Federal Prac-
tice as Affected by the New Rules of Civil Procedure (1939) 24 MINN. L. REv. 1, 34-
35; Chesnut, Analysis of Proposed New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1936) 22
A. B. A. J. 533, 540.
191. Guilford Construction Co. v. Biggs, 102 F. (2d) 46 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).
192. It has been asserted that this is not equivalent to "adopting" the equity rule.
Ilsen and Hone, Federal Appellate Practice as Affected by the New Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure (1939) 24 MnqN. L. REv. I, 34.
193. Clark and Moore, A New Federal Procedure (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 387, 414.
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owy nature of the distinctions between questions of fact and questions
of law.' 9 4
Against a review of the facts in equity cases, it may be argued
that since today equity courts may hear oral testimony as may the law
courts, there is no longer a need for review since an appellate court is
not in position to review oral testimony as effectively as it could review
documentary evidence.' 95 Thus, the natural tendency for appellate
courts in reviewing equity cases would be to follow the stricter law
scope of review. Furthermore, allowing review of the facts is likely
to increase the number of appeals taken.196 It has been thought that
appeals in equity cases were proportionately more numerous than in
actions at law because of the hope of obtaining a reversal on the
facts.117
It is further pointed out that the equity courts have themselves
by the development of certain principles of review made the scope of
equity review much like that of review at law.'98 In reviewing find-
ings of fact they have often said that such findings will stand in the
appellate court unless clearly erroneous, since the trial court had the
opportunity of seeing the witnesses. The appellate court will distin-
guish between findings based on conflicting evidence and those based
on undisputed evidence. It will also distinguish between findings
based on oral testimony given in open court and those based on written
documents. Findings based on conflicting evidence or oral testimony
are presumed to be correct, and can be rebutted only by a clear showing
of obvious error. As a consequence equity cases are actually seldom
reversed on the facts.
199
It is also pointed out that adopting the equity mode of review con-
tinues two methods of reviewing cases. Under the old system equity
cases were reviewed in one way and law cases, whether with or with-
out a jury, in another way.200 Under the'new system jury cases are
reviewed one way and non-jury cases, whether equity or law, in another
way. On the other hand, the adoption of the law method would mean
a single method. The Seventh Amendment makes this the only single,
uniform method available. Broad definition of error of law will pre-
vent hardship in individual cases.
194. Clark, The New Illinois Civil Practice Act (1933) I U. OF CHI. L. R1v. 209,
221.
195. Ilsen and Hone, Federal Appellate Practice as Affected by the New Rules of
Civil Procedure (1939) 24 MINN. L. Rav. I, 32.
196. Id. at 33.
197. Chesnut, Analysis of Proposed New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1936)
22 A. B. A. J. 533, 540.
198. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES (194I) 3oo; Clark and Stone,
Review of Findings of Fact (i937) 4 U. OF CHI. L. REV. I9O, 207.
I99. Clark and Stone, loc. cit. supra note 198, at 208-209.
2oo. Clark, Review of Facts Under Proposed Federal Rules (1936) 2o J. Am. JuD.
Soc. 129.
APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN EQUITY
Judge Clark has stated in criticism of the equity form of review
that it
"not only invites reversals in cases fully and adequately tried and
decided by the trial court, but it has the special disadvantage that
it retains a divided procedure which it is the chief purpose of the
proposed reform to abolish in the federal courts. Nor do I believe
it capable of demonstration that in states following the rule of
complete union even on appeal, states as widely separated as Con-
necticut and New Mexico, there is a more notable failure of jus-
tice than in other states, such as New York, where the rule does,
not obtain.
Without question the old distinction between equity and jury
cases should be wiped out as affects review as well as original
trial." 201
Judge Clark has also argued against the equity scope of review
"that the equity review in like manner is an administrative one, as
compared to the law review which is a judicial one." 202 Since facts
are not reviewed in the cases of administrative tribunals they should
not be as to equity courts. However, granting for the purpose of
argument that the cases are analogous, one should note that a consid-
erable group of lawyers advocate that judicial power be extended to
review of the facts found by administrative tribunals.
Federal District Judge Chesnut of Maryland objected to the use
of the equity model for a number of reasons.20 3  He felt that to give
less weight to the findings of the court than to the verdict of a jury
would tend to derogate from the importance of the judicial function.
But the trial judge could review on motion for a new trial. More-
over, is not the judicial function treated respectfully in equity cases
and in cases tried on the Continent? Judge Chesnut also felt that an
appellate court was not in position to review the facts. But with the
common use of court stenographers the appellate court can act much
more effectively than it once could. Moreover, the appellate court is
likely to be cautious about substituting its own judgment. In the third
place, Judge Chesnut thought that long appellate records and more
appeals would be encouraged. But justice may require more appeals.
Furthermore, review of the facts might be made discretionary.
Having rehearsed the arguments against review of the facts, let
us examine those in favor. Mistakes of fact can be and often are
2O. Ibid.
202. Clark and Stone, loc. cit. supra note 198, at 214. But see PouND, op. cit.
supra note 198, at 30.
203. Chesnut, loc. cit. mtpra note 197. Compare his views as set out in Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Washington Institute (1938) 8o-89.
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more prejudicial than errors of law. 20 4 A review of the facts is desir-
able and even necessary in order to maintain popular confidence in the
administration of justice. Appellate courts should not be compelled
to admit that they cannot decide cases according to the merits. A
review of the whole case makes it possible to dispose of it without the
need for a new trial and possible subsequent appeals. 20 5  Technical
decisions result when a tribunal deems that it can review only issues
of law.20 6 The court may, as frequently happens in criminal cases,
reverse for an alleged error of law where the true reason was its belief
that there was error of fact. Even in case of review of judgments at
law there must be some review of the facts to examine the sufficiency
of the facts to sustain the judgment. Moreover, there is no clear dis-
tinction between questions of law and questions of fact.
The arguments against review of the facts go chiefly to the ques-
tion of expediency; as, that the appellate court will be overburdened
with work which it is not well suited for,20 7 and that the development
of the law of the jurisdiction will be frustrated because of concentra-
tion on the facts.
According to Professor Blume, the writ of error method of review
failed in equity cases, and was repealed in 1803, because questions of
law and questions of fact were so intermingled that it was very diffi-
cult to keep them apart, because in a large number of cases the only
important questions were questions of fact, and because too much
power was left to the trial judge.
20 8
The new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have greatly improved
the former system. In the words of Professor Sunderland: "Fed-
eral appellate procedure has heretofore been about as bad as any sys-
tem.' It probably is now about as good as any system." 209
204. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA (1939) 84. Accord: Shapiro, Crim-
inal Appeal on the Facts and the Federal Judicial System (1939) 34 ILL. L. REv. 332.
205. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA (1939) 88.
206. Id. at 83.
207. Id. at 85; Atkin, Appeal in English Law (1927) 3 CAMB. L. J. I, 8.
208. Blume, Review of Facts in Jury Cases (1g6) 20 J. AM. Jun. Soc. 68, 69-70.
209. New Federal Rides of Civil Procedure as Related to Judicial Procedure in
Ohio (939) 13 U. CIN. L. REv. i, 129. See also, PouND, op. cit. supra note 198, at
328-329.
